MONEY LAUNDERER by Kenneth Rijock
So how did I evade arrest for a decade? Readers often ask how I was caught, assuming that I went to federal prison after being arrested with a suitcase of illicit cash at some US border checkpoint. In truth and in fact, I was never caught in the act, but because three clients, convicted and looking at serious prison time, turned upon me and the organisation's accountant. It is known as Substantial Assistance in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (then mandatory and now officially only a guide to District Court judges) and it allowed my former clients to reduce their sentences. But just how did I escape justice for all those years? Today I provide a glimpse into the precautions I observed to minimise my personal risk during that period, for the consequences of failure or discovery in a money laundering operation are serious.
- I never personally laundered the proceeds of crime in the United States. This was due in large part to bank reporting requirements, the ability of US law enforcement to seize and ultimately forfeit criminally-derived assets.
- I maintained absolutely no bank accounts in the US, operating on a strict cash payment basis to ensure that no records of any business transactions for criminal clients existed. This is much harder that it sounds, for though one might use third-party accounts that don't alert law enforcement investigators, it is more prudent to avoid it all together. I had no US bank accounts for five years, using an overseas tax haven account to obtain cashier's cheques drawn on a New York correspondent account very sparingly, and only for totally innocent personal transactions. All others were paid otherwise, using anonymous commercial money orders, postal money orders, or cold cash. Client expenses for vessel repair, aviation maintenance and overhaul, corporate service providers and other incriminating costs could only be paid in US currency.
- I was extremely low profile at work, sharing office space with three other lawyers, maintaining the smallest office, having no designated full-time secretary. The one secretary/paralegal who did type my work (the legitimate portion of my practice) knew precious little about my "unofficial" life as a laundryman, though she certainly suspected, I am sure. Later, when she feared that she might be called before the Grand Jury investigating some of my smuggling clients, she relocated to the UK for several months. (she had recently received a substantial settlement for injuries suffered at a friend's house, and could afford not to work)
- Regular office hours were kept, even if I had absolutely nothing to do that day, either involving my legal practice, or illicit work. After all, lawyers are supposed to be in their offices, and too much playtime, or ostentatious display of wealth during normal business hours, could raise suspicions. Of course, I did take an extended lunch hour, but still returned to work afterward. I also found that it was better if criminal clients found me at work when they needed me, and I didn't want their messages dominating office telephone message records.
- International travel in support of money laundering operations was generally done so as to ensure that my absences from the office were on Fridays or Mondays, when absence of even normal office workers is more common, and thus expected by callers. Haven't you ever called a professional on a Friday to find him or her absent, and think they were just making a three-day weekend out of it, or that they were too tired from the weekend's festivities to come in early on Monday?
- No credit cards or other credit facilities that leave records were employed; cash in advance when necessary was laid out at hotels, for airline tickets purchased barely before the flight closed, and for professional fees overseas, and again, in hard (US $ 100 bills) currency in soft currency jurisdictions, to ensure discretion and loyalty.
- Own nothing in your own name: rent your home and office, either lease an automobile or place it in the name of a third party. In short, make enquiries of your assets more difficult to discover, and information about your operation more difficult to link to you or your clients. If possible, reduce your profile even more by closing out legitimate business, whilst maintaining a fictitious facade that legitimate business is ongoing. return all telephone calls, but decline new business due to purported schedule overload.
Perhaps now you can understand how operational money laundering forces its practitioners to radically modify their lives, to avoid detection by the authorities. Do you still think it is a romantic calling?
Next Week: the Feds close in, and I adjust my operation.
The facts and opinions stated in this article are those of the author and not those of World-Check. World-Check does not warrant the accuracy of any facts and opinions stated in this article, does not endorse them, and accepts no responsibility for them.
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